Dreame enters the automotive industry—a familiar “super roadshow”

Recently, the social-media activity of Dreame CEO Yu Hao has readily evoked comparisons to Jia Yueting before 2017. In just two days in early May, he posted more than 120 Weibo entries, boldly articulating his vision for automobile manufacturing. He asserted that in China, only “Lei Jun, Richard Yu, and myself truly understand automotive design,” while painting an ambitious blueprint: a market capitalization exceeding one trillion dollars by 2028. Against the backdrop of roughly $95 trillion in total market capitalization among U.S. and Chinese listed companies, such talk of a “$100 trillion valuation” has been widely viewed as a high‑profile, attention‑grabbing narrative.

The “rocket car”–themed hypercar unveiled in New York this April boasts a 0‑to‑100 km/h sprint in just 0.9 seconds—outpacing Tesla’s yet-to-be‑mass‑produced sub‑one‑second benchmark. To anyone with a clear eye, it’s obvious this is an effort to position the brand against Tesla and set its tone. Yet relying on a high‑octane, non‑production‑ready concept vehicle powered by a rocket engine to elevate a brand’s profile raises serious questions about its real‑world impact. By contrast, Huawei’s “Zunjie” strategy may seem more straightforward, but it hinges on hard‑won strengths: meticulous design, premium materials, and deep technological expertise.
As of now, Dreame has yet to deliver a single mass‑produced vehicle. While its touted light‑asset OEM model has precedents—such as NIO and Li Auto—the client must establish a fully integrated supply chain, maintain on‑site supervision, and implement a robust quality‑control system. Dreame has not demonstrated the capability to manage these aspects, nor has it even disclosed who its contract manufacturer is. On the front of core technologies, Dreame has showcased in‑house‑developed innovations like wire‑controlled chassis and LiDAR; however, its claimed 60 Ah solid‑state battery cell remains far from being ready for integration into vehicles, and its 2027 mass‑production target is widely regarded as “utterly unrealistic.”

The more fundamental issue lies in the scale of investment. Huawei’s automotive business unit pours over ten billion yuan into R&D annually, while Xiaomi’s car‑making team numbers nearly 10,000, with development costs for its first‑generation SU7 exceeding ten billion yuan as well. By contrast, Dreame is not a publicly listed company; it projects 40 billion yuan in revenue and 5.56 billion yuan in net profit by 2025—though industry estimates suggest a net margin of less than 8%—meaning its scale falls short of even one order of magnitude compared to the major players’ outlays. Building cars is capital‑intensive, and Dreame clearly understands this. Some analysts speculate that Yu Hao’s high‑profile stance may be little more than a “show for investors.” At a time when venture capital has grown lukewarm toward new‑energy ventures, Dreame has managed to attract investments from local state‑owned funds in Jiaxing, Liuzhou, Yibin, and other regions by setting up numerous shell entities outside its core workforce. This strategy of “wide planting, thin harvest” taps into local governments’ incentives to lure investment, but given that automotive projects typically require hundreds of millions—or even billions—of yuan, and with state‑backed investment becoming increasingly stringent—especially after the bankruptcy of Neta Auto—the long-term sustainability of such a model remains questionable.
Meanwhile, Dreame is simultaneously preparing for an IPO on the STAR Market—having completed its guidance in 2025 and aiming to list in 2027—while also acquiring A-share‑listed Jiamai Packaging. Relying solely on home‑cleaning appliances makes it difficult to sustain a market capitalization of hundreds of billions; entering the automotive sector serves both as a destination for capital and as a financing strategy. Today, the key barrier is no longer technology but scale and delivery capacity. New brands often face the “sagging‑bottom” risk of their order books drying up within just a few months, triggering a cascade of supply‑chain disruptions. Although Dreame has yet to begin mass production, this may have spared it the peril of a rapid erosion of early‑stage reputation—but it has also missed a critical window for building brand equity. Consumers, especially those who drive luxury vehicles, are not opposed to ambition, but founders who come across as overly obsessive or “fanatical” tend to be shunned. Consequently, Dreame’s attempt to extend its brand identity from home‑cleaning appliances to ultra‑luxury automobiles has proven largely ineffective, and demonstrating both engineering prowess and automotive‑operations expertise remains exceedingly challenging—issues that cannot be resolved through fundraising alone.

Back then, FF collapsed because its capabilities fell short of its ambitions. Dreame is now treading a similar tightrope: even with funding in hand, it remains uncertain how to deliver genuine products and a strong brand to its investors.

Reposted from Sina Auto

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